Authentication Patterns (skill)
Contributed by Rohit Ghumare (awesome-claude-code-toolkit)
Source: original file · added 2026-10-29
Authentication and authorization patterns including OAuth2, JWT, RBAC, session management, and PKCE flows
Authentication Patterns
JWT Access and Refresh Tokens
import jwt from "jsonwebtoken";
interface TokenPayload {
sub: string;
email: string;
roles: string[];
}
function generateTokens(user: User) {
const accessToken = jwt.sign(
{ sub: user.id, email: user.email, roles: user.roles },
process.env.JWT_SECRET!,
{ expiresIn: "15m", issuer: "auth-service" }
);
const refreshToken = jwt.sign(
{ sub: user.id, tokenVersion: user.tokenVersion },
process.env.REFRESH_SECRET!,
{ expiresIn: "7d", issuer: "auth-service" }
);
return { accessToken, refreshToken };
}
function verifyAccessToken(token: string): TokenPayload {
return jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET!, {
issuer: "auth-service",
}) as TokenPayload;
}Short-lived access tokens (15 minutes) with longer-lived refresh tokens (7 days). Store refresh tokens in HTTP-only cookies.
Auth Middleware
function authenticate(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) {
const header = req.headers.authorization;
if (!header?.startsWith("Bearer ")) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: "Missing authorization header" });
}
try {
const payload = verifyAccessToken(header.slice(7));
req.user = payload;
next();
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof jwt.TokenExpiredError) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: "Token expired" });
}
return res.status(401).json({ error: "Invalid token" });
}
}
function authorize(...roles: string[]) {
return (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
if (!req.user) return res.status(401).json({ error: "Not authenticated" });
if (!roles.some(role => req.user.roles.includes(role))) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: "Insufficient permissions" });
}
next();
};
}
app.get("/admin/users", authenticate, authorize("admin"), listUsers);OAuth2 Authorization Code Flow with PKCE
import crypto from "crypto";
function generatePKCE() {
const verifier = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
const challenge = crypto
.createHash("sha256")
.update(verifier)
.digest("base64url");
return { verifier, challenge };
}
app.get("/auth/login", (req, res) => {
const { verifier, challenge } = generatePKCE();
req.session.codeVerifier = verifier;
const params = new URLSearchParams({
response_type: "code",
client_id: process.env.OAUTH_CLIENT_ID!,
redirect_uri: `${process.env.APP_URL}/auth/callback`,
scope: "openid profile email",
code_challenge: challenge,
code_challenge_method: "S256",
state: crypto.randomBytes(16).toString("hex"),
});
res.redirect(`${process.env.OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_URL}?${params}`);
});
app.get("/auth/callback", async (req, res) => {
const { code } = req.query;
const tokenResponse = await fetch(process.env.OAUTH_TOKEN_URL!, {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: "authorization_code",
code: code as string,
redirect_uri: `${process.env.APP_URL}/auth/callback`,
client_id: process.env.OAUTH_CLIENT_ID!,
code_verifier: req.session.codeVerifier,
}),
});
const tokens = await tokenResponse.json();
const userInfo = jwt.decode(tokens.id_token);
req.session.user = { id: userInfo.sub, email: userInfo.email };
res.redirect("/dashboard");
});RBAC Model
interface Permission {
resource: string;
action: "create" | "read" | "update" | "delete";
}
const ROLE_PERMISSIONS: Record<string, Permission[]> = {
viewer: [
{ resource: "posts", action: "read" },
{ resource: "comments", action: "read" },
],
editor: [
{ resource: "posts", action: "create" },
{ resource: "posts", action: "read" },
{ resource: "posts", action: "update" },
{ resource: "comments", action: "create" },
{ resource: "comments", action: "read" },
],
admin: [
{ resource: "*", action: "create" },
{ resource: "*", action: "read" },
{ resource: "*", action: "update" },
{ resource: "*", action: "delete" },
],
};
function hasPermission(roles: string[], resource: string, action: string): boolean {
return roles.some(role =>
ROLE_PERMISSIONS[role]?.some(
p => (p.resource === resource || p.resource === "*") && p.action === action
)
);
}Anti-Patterns
- Storing JWTs in
localStorage(vulnerable to XSS; use HTTP-only cookies) - Using symmetric secrets for JWTs across multiple services (use RS256 with key pairs)
- Not validating
iss,aud, andexpclaims on token verification - Implementing custom password hashing instead of using bcrypt/argon2
- Missing CSRF protection on cookie-based authentication
- Returning different error messages for "user not found" vs "wrong password" (user enumeration)
Checklist
- Access tokens are short-lived (15 minutes or less)
- Refresh tokens stored in HTTP-only, Secure, SameSite cookies
- Passwords hashed with bcrypt or argon2 (never MD5/SHA)
- OAuth2 PKCE flow used for public clients
- RBAC permissions checked at both route and data access layers
- Token revocation supported via version counter or blocklist
- CSRF protection enabled for cookie-based auth
- Authentication errors do not reveal whether the user exists
Original source file (unmodified)
--- name: authentication-patterns description: Authentication and authorization patterns including OAuth2, JWT, RBAC, session management, and PKCE flows --- # Authentication Patterns ## JWT Access and Refresh Tokens ```typescript import jwt from "jsonwebtoken"; interface TokenPayload { sub: string; email: string; roles: string[]; } function generateTokens(user: User) { const accessToken = jwt.sign( { sub: user.id, email: user.email, roles: user.roles }, process.env.JWT_SECRET!, { expiresIn: "15m", issuer: "auth-service" } ); const refreshToken = jwt.sign( { sub: user.id, tokenVersion: user.tokenVersion }, process.env.REFRESH_SECRET!, { expiresIn: "7d", issuer: "auth-service" } ); return { accessToken, refreshToken }; } function verifyAccessToken(token: string): TokenPayload { return jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET!, { issuer: "auth-service", }) as TokenPayload; } ``` Short-lived access tokens (15 minutes) with longer-lived refresh tokens (7 days). Store refresh tokens in HTTP-only cookies. ## Auth Middleware ```typescript function authenticate(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) { const header = req.headers.authorization; if (!header?.startsWith("Bearer ")) { return res.status(401).json({ error: "Missing authorization header" }); } try { const payload = verifyAccessToken(header.slice(7)); req.user = payload; next(); } catch (error) { if (error instanceof jwt.TokenExpiredError) { return res.status(401).json({ error: "Token expired" }); } return res.status(401).json({ error: "Invalid token" }); } } function authorize(...roles: string[]) { return (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => { if (!req.user) return res.status(401).json({ error: "Not authenticated" }); if (!roles.some(role => req.user.roles.includes(role))) { return res.status(403).json({ error: "Insufficient permissions" }); } next(); }; } app.get("/admin/users", authenticate, authorize("admin"), listUsers); ``` ## OAuth2 Authorization Code Flow with PKCE ```typescript import crypto from "crypto"; function generatePKCE() { const verifier = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString("base64url"); const challenge = crypto .createHash("sha256") .update(verifier) .digest("base64url"); return { verifier, challenge }; } app.get("/auth/login", (req, res) => { const { verifier, challenge } = generatePKCE(); req.session.codeVerifier = verifier; const params = new URLSearchParams({ response_type: "code", client_id: process.env.OAUTH_CLIENT_ID!, redirect_uri: `${process.env.APP_URL}/auth/callback`, scope: "openid profile email", code_challenge: challenge, code_challenge_method: "S256", state: crypto.randomBytes(16).toString("hex"), }); res.redirect(`${process.env.OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_URL}?${params}`); }); app.get("/auth/callback", async (req, res) => { const { code } = req.query; const tokenResponse = await fetch(process.env.OAUTH_TOKEN_URL!, { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" }, body: new URLSearchParams({ grant_type: "authorization_code", code: code as string, redirect_uri: `${process.env.APP_URL}/auth/callback`, client_id: process.env.OAUTH_CLIENT_ID!, code_verifier: req.session.codeVerifier, }), }); const tokens = await tokenResponse.json(); const userInfo = jwt.decode(tokens.id_token); req.session.user = { id: userInfo.sub, email: userInfo.email }; res.redirect("/dashboard"); }); ``` ## RBAC Model ```typescript interface Permission { resource: string; action: "create" | "read" | "update" | "delete"; } const ROLE_PERMISSIONS: Record<string, Permission[]> = { viewer: [ { resource: "posts", action: "read" }, { resource: "comments", action: "read" }, ], editor: [ { resource: "posts", action: "create" }, { resource: "posts", action: "read" }, { resource: "posts", action: "update" }, { resource: "comments", action: "create" }, { resource: "comments", action: "read" }, ], admin: [ { resource: "*", action: "create" }, { resource: "*", action: "read" }, { resource: "*", action: "update" }, { resource: "*", action: "delete" }, ], }; function hasPermission(roles: string[], resource: string, action: string): boolean { return roles.some(role => ROLE_PERMISSIONS[role]?.some( p => (p.resource === resource || p.resource === "*") && p.action === action ) ); } ``` ## Anti-Patterns - Storing JWTs in `localStorage` (vulnerable to XSS; use HTTP-only cookies) - Using symmetric secrets for JWTs across multiple services (use RS256 with key pairs) - Not validating `iss`, `aud`, and `exp` claims on token verification - Implementing custom password hashing instead of using bcrypt/argon2 - Missing CSRF protection on cookie-based authentication - Returning different error messages for "user not found" vs "wrong password" (user enumeration) ## Checklist - [ ] Access tokens are short-lived (15 minutes or less) - [ ] Refresh tokens stored in HTTP-only, Secure, SameSite cookies - [ ] Passwords hashed with bcrypt or argon2 (never MD5/SHA) - [ ] OAuth2 PKCE flow used for public clients - [ ] RBAC permissions checked at both route and data access layers - [ ] Token revocation supported via version counter or blocklist - [ ] CSRF protection enabled for cookie-based auth - [ ] Authentication errors do not reveal whether the user exists