Claude Code skill For developers

Authentication Patterns (skill)

Contributed by Rohit Ghumare (awesome-claude-code-toolkit)

Source: original file · added 2026-10-29

Authentication and authorization patterns including OAuth2, JWT, RBAC, session management, and PKCE flows

Authentication Patterns

JWT Access and Refresh Tokens

typescript
import jwt from "jsonwebtoken";

interface TokenPayload {
  sub: string;
  email: string;
  roles: string[];
}

function generateTokens(user: User) {
  const accessToken = jwt.sign(
    { sub: user.id, email: user.email, roles: user.roles },
    process.env.JWT_SECRET!,
    { expiresIn: "15m", issuer: "auth-service" }
  );

  const refreshToken = jwt.sign(
    { sub: user.id, tokenVersion: user.tokenVersion },
    process.env.REFRESH_SECRET!,
    { expiresIn: "7d", issuer: "auth-service" }
  );

  return { accessToken, refreshToken };
}

function verifyAccessToken(token: string): TokenPayload {
  return jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET!, {
    issuer: "auth-service",
  }) as TokenPayload;
}

Short-lived access tokens (15 minutes) with longer-lived refresh tokens (7 days). Store refresh tokens in HTTP-only cookies.

Auth Middleware

typescript
function authenticate(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) {
  const header = req.headers.authorization;
  if (!header?.startsWith("Bearer ")) {
    return res.status(401).json({ error: "Missing authorization header" });
  }

  try {
    const payload = verifyAccessToken(header.slice(7));
    req.user = payload;
    next();
  } catch (error) {
    if (error instanceof jwt.TokenExpiredError) {
      return res.status(401).json({ error: "Token expired" });
    }
    return res.status(401).json({ error: "Invalid token" });
  }
}

function authorize(...roles: string[]) {
  return (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
    if (!req.user) return res.status(401).json({ error: "Not authenticated" });
    if (!roles.some(role => req.user.roles.includes(role))) {
      return res.status(403).json({ error: "Insufficient permissions" });
    }
    next();
  };
}

app.get("/admin/users", authenticate, authorize("admin"), listUsers);

OAuth2 Authorization Code Flow with PKCE

typescript
import crypto from "crypto";

function generatePKCE() {
  const verifier = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
  const challenge = crypto
    .createHash("sha256")
    .update(verifier)
    .digest("base64url");
  return { verifier, challenge };
}

app.get("/auth/login", (req, res) => {
  const { verifier, challenge } = generatePKCE();
  req.session.codeVerifier = verifier;

  const params = new URLSearchParams({
    response_type: "code",
    client_id: process.env.OAUTH_CLIENT_ID!,
    redirect_uri: `${process.env.APP_URL}/auth/callback`,
    scope: "openid profile email",
    code_challenge: challenge,
    code_challenge_method: "S256",
    state: crypto.randomBytes(16).toString("hex"),
  });

  res.redirect(`${process.env.OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_URL}?${params}`);
});

app.get("/auth/callback", async (req, res) => {
  const { code } = req.query;

  const tokenResponse = await fetch(process.env.OAUTH_TOKEN_URL!, {
    method: "POST",
    headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
    body: new URLSearchParams({
      grant_type: "authorization_code",
      code: code as string,
      redirect_uri: `${process.env.APP_URL}/auth/callback`,
      client_id: process.env.OAUTH_CLIENT_ID!,
      code_verifier: req.session.codeVerifier,
    }),
  });

  const tokens = await tokenResponse.json();
  const userInfo = jwt.decode(tokens.id_token);

  req.session.user = { id: userInfo.sub, email: userInfo.email };
  res.redirect("/dashboard");
});

RBAC Model

typescript
interface Permission {
  resource: string;
  action: "create" | "read" | "update" | "delete";
}

const ROLE_PERMISSIONS: Record<string, Permission[]> = {
  viewer: [
    { resource: "posts", action: "read" },
    { resource: "comments", action: "read" },
  ],
  editor: [
    { resource: "posts", action: "create" },
    { resource: "posts", action: "read" },
    { resource: "posts", action: "update" },
    { resource: "comments", action: "create" },
    { resource: "comments", action: "read" },
  ],
  admin: [
    { resource: "*", action: "create" },
    { resource: "*", action: "read" },
    { resource: "*", action: "update" },
    { resource: "*", action: "delete" },
  ],
};

function hasPermission(roles: string[], resource: string, action: string): boolean {
  return roles.some(role =>
    ROLE_PERMISSIONS[role]?.some(
      p => (p.resource === resource || p.resource === "*") && p.action === action
    )
  );
}

Anti-Patterns

  • Storing JWTs in localStorage (vulnerable to XSS; use HTTP-only cookies)
  • Using symmetric secrets for JWTs across multiple services (use RS256 with key pairs)
  • Not validating iss, aud, and exp claims on token verification
  • Implementing custom password hashing instead of using bcrypt/argon2
  • Missing CSRF protection on cookie-based authentication
  • Returning different error messages for "user not found" vs "wrong password" (user enumeration)

Checklist

  • Access tokens are short-lived (15 minutes or less)
  • Refresh tokens stored in HTTP-only, Secure, SameSite cookies
  • Passwords hashed with bcrypt or argon2 (never MD5/SHA)
  • OAuth2 PKCE flow used for public clients
  • RBAC permissions checked at both route and data access layers
  • Token revocation supported via version counter or blocklist
  • CSRF protection enabled for cookie-based auth
  • Authentication errors do not reveal whether the user exists
Original source file (unmodified)

--- name: authentication-patterns description: Authentication and authorization patterns including OAuth2, JWT, RBAC, session management, and PKCE flows --- # Authentication Patterns ## JWT Access and Refresh Tokens ```typescript import jwt from "jsonwebtoken"; interface TokenPayload { sub: string; email: string; roles: string[]; } function generateTokens(user: User) { const accessToken = jwt.sign( { sub: user.id, email: user.email, roles: user.roles }, process.env.JWT_SECRET!, { expiresIn: "15m", issuer: "auth-service" } ); const refreshToken = jwt.sign( { sub: user.id, tokenVersion: user.tokenVersion }, process.env.REFRESH_SECRET!, { expiresIn: "7d", issuer: "auth-service" } ); return { accessToken, refreshToken }; } function verifyAccessToken(token: string): TokenPayload { return jwt.verify(token, process.env.JWT_SECRET!, { issuer: "auth-service", }) as TokenPayload; } ``` Short-lived access tokens (15 minutes) with longer-lived refresh tokens (7 days). Store refresh tokens in HTTP-only cookies. ## Auth Middleware ```typescript function authenticate(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) { const header = req.headers.authorization; if (!header?.startsWith("Bearer ")) { return res.status(401).json({ error: "Missing authorization header" }); } try { const payload = verifyAccessToken(header.slice(7)); req.user = payload; next(); } catch (error) { if (error instanceof jwt.TokenExpiredError) { return res.status(401).json({ error: "Token expired" }); } return res.status(401).json({ error: "Invalid token" }); } } function authorize(...roles: string[]) { return (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => { if (!req.user) return res.status(401).json({ error: "Not authenticated" }); if (!roles.some(role => req.user.roles.includes(role))) { return res.status(403).json({ error: "Insufficient permissions" }); } next(); }; } app.get("/admin/users", authenticate, authorize("admin"), listUsers); ``` ## OAuth2 Authorization Code Flow with PKCE ```typescript import crypto from "crypto"; function generatePKCE() { const verifier = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString("base64url"); const challenge = crypto .createHash("sha256") .update(verifier) .digest("base64url"); return { verifier, challenge }; } app.get("/auth/login", (req, res) => { const { verifier, challenge } = generatePKCE(); req.session.codeVerifier = verifier; const params = new URLSearchParams({ response_type: "code", client_id: process.env.OAUTH_CLIENT_ID!, redirect_uri: `${process.env.APP_URL}/auth/callback`, scope: "openid profile email", code_challenge: challenge, code_challenge_method: "S256", state: crypto.randomBytes(16).toString("hex"), }); res.redirect(`${process.env.OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_URL}?${params}`); }); app.get("/auth/callback", async (req, res) => { const { code } = req.query; const tokenResponse = await fetch(process.env.OAUTH_TOKEN_URL!, { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" }, body: new URLSearchParams({ grant_type: "authorization_code", code: code as string, redirect_uri: `${process.env.APP_URL}/auth/callback`, client_id: process.env.OAUTH_CLIENT_ID!, code_verifier: req.session.codeVerifier, }), }); const tokens = await tokenResponse.json(); const userInfo = jwt.decode(tokens.id_token); req.session.user = { id: userInfo.sub, email: userInfo.email }; res.redirect("/dashboard"); }); ``` ## RBAC Model ```typescript interface Permission { resource: string; action: "create" | "read" | "update" | "delete"; } const ROLE_PERMISSIONS: Record<string, Permission[]> = { viewer: [ { resource: "posts", action: "read" }, { resource: "comments", action: "read" }, ], editor: [ { resource: "posts", action: "create" }, { resource: "posts", action: "read" }, { resource: "posts", action: "update" }, { resource: "comments", action: "create" }, { resource: "comments", action: "read" }, ], admin: [ { resource: "*", action: "create" }, { resource: "*", action: "read" }, { resource: "*", action: "update" }, { resource: "*", action: "delete" }, ], }; function hasPermission(roles: string[], resource: string, action: string): boolean { return roles.some(role => ROLE_PERMISSIONS[role]?.some( p => (p.resource === resource || p.resource === "*") && p.action === action ) ); } ``` ## Anti-Patterns - Storing JWTs in `localStorage` (vulnerable to XSS; use HTTP-only cookies) - Using symmetric secrets for JWTs across multiple services (use RS256 with key pairs) - Not validating `iss`, `aud`, and `exp` claims on token verification - Implementing custom password hashing instead of using bcrypt/argon2 - Missing CSRF protection on cookie-based authentication - Returning different error messages for "user not found" vs "wrong password" (user enumeration) ## Checklist - [ ] Access tokens are short-lived (15 minutes or less) - [ ] Refresh tokens stored in HTTP-only, Secure, SameSite cookies - [ ] Passwords hashed with bcrypt or argon2 (never MD5/SHA) - [ ] OAuth2 PKCE flow used for public clients - [ ] RBAC permissions checked at both route and data access layers - [ ] Token revocation supported via version counter or blocklist - [ ] CSRF protection enabled for cookie-based auth - [ ] Authentication errors do not reveal whether the user exists

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